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CHARLES EMORY GLANDERt
Most lawyers, including those whose practice is con-
fined to criminal matters, are relatively inexperienced in
the field of criminal extradition. This fact, probably more
than any other, accounts for the assertion frequently made
by counsel at extradition hearings in the office of the gov-
ernor: "I am familiar with the statutes, but somewhat
rusty on procedure."
The lawyer is not responsible for his lack of knowledge
or experience. The truth of the matter is that no clear-cut
standard of procedure exists. The extradition statutes are
clear enough as to most formal requirements, but they af-
ford little assistance with respect to procedure or practice
generally. For example, the extradition hearing which is
conducted in the office of the governor is not mentioned in
the Ohio statutes. There is likewise considerable confu-
sion concerning the legal questions that may be raised at
the hearing. It is the writer's purpose, therefore, to under-
take an analysis of the Ohio law and practice from a prac-
tical administrative point of view. In this connection,
reference will be made to actual case situations that re-
cently have been presented in the governor's office.
- Mtember of the Columbus Bar; Executive Secretary to The Honorable
John W. Bricker, Governor of Ohio.
(255)
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The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act became effec-
tive in Ohio in 1937.1 It also has been adopted in thirty
other states.2 Like all previous statutes of similar char-
acter, it is designed to implement the mandatory require-
ment of the United States Constitution3 and Statutes4 with
reference to fugitives from justice.
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-1 to 109-32 inc. For former analogous sections see
OHIO G. C. secs. 109 to 115 inc. which were repealed upon adoption of the
Uniform Act. Legislative history: Rev. Stat. 95, 81 Ohio L. 23 (1884), 78
Ohio L. 49 (1881), 72 Ohio L. 79 (1875), 67 Ohio L. 171 (J. R. 1870).
'Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Del., Fla., Id., Ind., Kan., Maine, Md., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., N. H., N. J., N. M., N. Y., N. Car., Ore., Pa.,
S. D., Utah, Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo. The Act likewise has been
adopted in Hawaii. There are minor differences between the acts adopted by
the states. See 9 UNIFORir LAWS ANN., "Extradition" p. 174 et seq. For gen-
eral background, see Prefatory Note, id. at 170.
'U. S. CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 2: "A person charged in any State with
treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction
of the crime." Extradition has been defined as the right of one state to demand,
and the duty of another to surrender, fugitives from justice from the former
state into the latter. See Thomas v. Evans, 73 Ohio St. 140, 76 N. E. 862
(1905) ; ScoTr, INTERsTATE RENDITION (1917), P. 1, par. 1. Strictly speaking,
use of the term "extradition" in interstate cases, is inaccurate and "is plainly
to misapply the real meaning of the word . . . as derived and understood from
its long usage in connection with international law . . . ; accuracy and precision
in the use of words demand the adoption of 'rendition'-the meaning of which
is clear and unmistakable." SCOTT, op. cit. supra at 2.
4 Rev. Stat. 5278, 5979, 18 U. S. C. secs. 66'2, 663 (1793). Sec. 662 pro-
vides: "Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands
any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State
or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment
found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory,
charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State
or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of
the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled
to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be
given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such
authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be deliv-
ered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six
months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged . . ."
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The provisions of the Uniform Act may be grouped
under two general classifications: (1) those which pertain
to the rendition of persons who are charged with crime in
another state and are found in this state, and (2) those
which pertain to the requisition of persons who are charged
with crime in this state and are found in another state.
For convenience and clarity we shall consider each classifi-
cation separately even though the various sections of the
Act do not follow tlis sequence.
It should be observed at the outset that the Uniform
Act itself is limited to matters of interstate rendition.
However, there are Ohio statutes which cover cases of
international extradition, but which are beyond the scope
of this discussion.'
RENDITION OF FUGITIVES FOUND IN THIS STATE
Procedzire Pending Receipt of Requisition
Let us suppose that B, an alleged fugitive from the
state of X, is found in Ohio and is placed under arrest.
He may be charged with crime in the state of X or, having
been convicted of a crime in that state, he may have escaped
from confinement, or he may have broken the terms of his
bail, probation, or parole. In any such case, the procedure
preliminary to extradition is substantially the same. The
arrest may have been made upon a warrant issued by a
judge or magistrate of this state and supported by a
"sworn charge or complaint and affidavit" ;' or it may have
' OHIo G. C. secs. 116, 117; see 18 0. Jum. "Extradition" par. 2, 4, 13, 28;
22 Am. JUR. "Extradition" par. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 37, 39, 49, 60, 62.
'OHIO G. C. sec. 109-13. The sworn charge or affidavit must set forth that
the accused is charged with crime in the demanding state and has fled from
justice thereof, or that he was convicted of crime in that state and escaped from
confinement, or that he has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole.
Ibid.
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been made without a warrant "upon reasonable informa-
tion that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state
with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year."' In either event, the accused
must be brought before the judge or magistrate, and if it
appears that he is the person charged with having com-
mitted the alleged crime and is a fugitive from justice, the
judge or magistrate must commit him to jail for not more
than thirty days pending receipt of extradition papers.8
The judge or magistrate may admit the accused to "bail
by bond, with sufficient sureties, and in such sum as he
deems proper," unless the offense charged is punishable by
death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in
which it was committed.'
After his arrest, four courses of action are open to the
accused. (1) He may decide to waive issuance and service
of the governor's warrant and all other procedure inci-
dental to extradition by executing in the presence of a
judge of any court of record a written consent to return
to the demanding state.1" (2) He may elect to resist the
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-14. But note that if the arrest is made without a
warrant the accused must be taken before a judge or magistrate without delay
and "complaint must be made against him under oath setting forth the ground
for the arrest as in the preceding section." Ibid.
'OHIO G. C. sec. 109-15. Compare procedure for holding the accused
pending receipt of requisition under Uniform Extradition Act with the pro-
visions of OHIO G. C. sec. 13434-1 to 13434-3 inc. enacted in 1929; see also 18
0. JUR. "Extradition" p. 935, par. 6.
' OHIo G. C. sec. 109-16. The accused may be released or discharged if he
is not arrested under warrant of the governor at the expiration of the time fixed
by the judge or magistrate, or he may be recommitted for a further period not
to exceed sixty days or again admitted to bail. OHIo G. C. sec. 109-17. If the
accused is admitted to bail and subsequently fails to appear, the judge or
magistrate shall declare the bond forfeited and order his immediate arrest if
he is within the state. Recovery also may be had on such bond. OHIo G. C.
sec. 109-18.
10 OHIo G. C. sec. 109-26. Before the waiver is executed, it is the duty of
the judge to inform the accused in open court of his rights to the issuance of
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issuance of the governor's warrant and for such purpose
may request a hearing in the executive offices. (3) He may
decide not to avail himself of an executive hearing but
choose instead to apply for a writ of habeas corpus after
warrant of the governor has been issued." (4) He may
adopt a policy of passive resistance-that is, he may simply
await completion of the extradition process but do nothing
to assist or impede it. It is the duty of counsel, of course,
to advise the accused as to the appropriate course of action
in the light of all the facts.
The Executive Hearing
Let us assume now that the accused chooses to resist
issuance of the governor's warrant. The first step is that
of requesting a hearing. As hereinbefore indicated, there
is no statutory provision for a hearing in the executive
offices. However, it has long been the practice in Ohio to
grant such hearings upon request by the accused or his
counsel. The request may be made by letter, by telegram
or by telephone. If promptly made, it will reach the execu-
tive offices in advance of the demand from the governor of
the state which is seeking extradition. It should clearly
specify the name or names by which the accused is charged
and otherwise known, the charge upon which extradition
probably will be sought, the state likely to make the demand
and the name and address of counsel, if any. Upon re-
a xarrant and to obtain a writ of habeas corpus. After the waiver has been
executed, it must be forwarded to the office of the governor and filed therein.
The waiver procedure itself may not be deemed to limit the rights of the
accused to return voluntarily and without formality to the demanding state
before demand has been made, nor shall it be deemed to be an exclusive pro-
cedure. Ibid.
a' OHIO G. C. sec. 10-10. This procedure also may be followed where a
hearing in the executive offices has been requested and held and a decision
adverse to the accused has been rendered.
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ceipt, the request is acknowledged and recorded in a special
docket. If and when extradition papers are received, the
matter is scheduled for hearing at a definite time and all
interested parties are notified thereof immediately. If ex-
tradition papers are presented personally by the duly ac-
credited agent of the demanding state, the matter is sched-
uled for hearing on the first or second days next succeed-
ing receipt thereof, subject to engagements of counsel for
accused. On the other hand, if the papers are filed by mail,
the hearing is scheduled at the earliest convenient time,
usually within a week.
While the issuance or refusal of an extradition warrant
is within the final jurisdiction of the governor, " the details
are handled by his administrative staff. All hearings are
before the executive secretary " who consider the evidence
and makes a finding as to the facts and the law applicable
thereto. It is the practice of the executive secretary at the
present time to render an oral opinion at the conclusion of
the hearing in which a recommendation for or against is-
suance of the governor's warrant is included. This opinion
is taken down by a stenographer, transcribed and sub-
mitted to the governor. Copies thereof, if desired, are
furnished to counsel for the accused and the demanding
jurisdiction.
The hearings, while not complicated, are conducted
with some degree of formality at the present time. In gen-
eral, the rules of procedure may be summarized as follows:
'lit re Polly, 3 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 265, 16 Ohio D. (N. P.) 427 (1905);
It re Craig, 7 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 307, 19 Ohio D. (x. P.) 843 (1908) ; It re
Payne, 7 Ohio D. Rep. 288, 2 W. L. Bull. 76 (1877).
IS "The governor, upon receipt of a demand from the chief executive
authority of another state for extradition of a person found within the jurisdic-
tion of this state, may properly delegate to a subordinate in his office the
authority to hear matters relating to such extradition and report to him, and if
satisfied from such report, may take action thereon." 1929 Ohio Atty. Gen.
Opinions No. 31.
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(1) After the hearing is called to order, counsel for the
accused or for the demanding jurisdiction may request a
separation of the witnesses.
(2) The requisition of the demanding state is pre-
sented by the duly appointed agent of that jurisdiction and
the same may be examined by counsel for the accused.
(3) The requisition of the demanding jurisdiction will
be recognized by the governor, and extradition will be
granted, unless it is shown that the same is defective, or
other valid objections are established.14
(4) The following matters may be inquired into during
the course of the hearing:
(a) Whether the requisition of the demanding
state is in conformity with all' statutory re-
quirements as to form and content.15
(b) Whether the accused is substantially charged
with having committed a crime under the laws
of the demanding state, or with having been
convicted of a crime in that state and having
escaped from confinement, or having broken
the terms of his bail, probation or parole.'
(c) Whether the accused was present in the de-
manding state at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, and thereafter fled from
that state'; or, in the alternative, whether the
accused is charged with committing an act in
U "Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the constitution
of the United States controlling, and any and all acts of congress enacted in
pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested
and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United
States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who
has fled from justice and is found in this state." OHio G. C. see. 109-2.
' OIalO G. C. sec. 109-3.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
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this state, or in a third state, intentionally re-
sulting in a crime in the demanding state."
(d) Whether the accused is properly identified as
the person charged with crime.
(e) Whether the proceedings were instituted in
good faith for the prosecution of an alleged
crime.
(5) The order of procedure is substantially the same
as that prescribed for criminal trials in this state," modi-
fied as follows:
(a) Counsel or the duly appointed agent of the de-
manding state will make the opening statement
and offer the requisition and any supporting
evidence. The accused or his counsel shall
have the right to cross-examine all witnesses
for the demanding jurisdiction.
(b) The accused or his counsel may then state his
objections to the demand and offer his evi-
dence in support thereof. Counsel or agent
for the demanding jurisdiction shall have the
right to cross-examine all witnesses for the
accused.
(c) The demanding jurisdiction will then be con-
fined to rebutting evidence, but for good
reason, and in furtherance of justice, the ex-
ecutive secretary may permit evidence to be
presented by either side out of its order.
(d) When the evidence is concluded, unless the
matter is submitted without argument, the
counsel or agent for the demanding jurisdic-
"OHIO G. C. sec. 109-6.
1 9OHio G. C. sec. 13442-8.
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tion shall commence, the accused or his counsel
shall follow, and the counsel or agent for the
demanding jurisdiction shall conclude the ar-
gument.
(e) The executive secretary has authority to devi-
ate from the foregoing order of proceedings
when in his discretion it is deemed proper.
The purpose of the executive hearing, of course, is to
enable the governor to determine whether the person de-
manded ought to be surrendered. Other means of making
this determination are also at the governor's command.
The Uniform Act provides that he "may call upon the at-
torney general or any prosecuting officer in this state to
investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to
report to him the situation and circumstances of the per-
son so demanded, and whether he ought to be surren-
dered." " This provision has seldom, if ever, been used
since enactment of the Uniform Act. Very frequently,
however, a member of the attorney general's staff or that
of the prosecuting attorney of Franklin County, Ohio,
appears as counsel for the demanding jurisdiction as a
matter of courtesy. In such capacity, however, the rep-
resentative of the attorney general or the prosecuting at-
torney appears as an advocate rather than as a referee.
It is desirable at this point to consider in some detail
the several matters concerning which inquiry may be made
during the course of the hearing in the office of the gover-
nor. While a complete survey of the authorities cannot
be made herein, consideration will be given to controlling
or significant decisions, with emphasis upon the Ohio law
pertaining to each question.
" OHIO G. C. sec. 109-4.
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Requirements as to Form of Requisition
The Uniform Act provides that the demand or requisi-
tion must be in writing, that it must contain certain alle-
gations as to the status of the accused as a fugitive, and
that it must be accompanied by one of the following docu-
ments: "by a copy of an indictment found or by informa-
tion supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction
of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a
magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant
which was issued thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of
conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof,
together with a statement by the executive author-
ity of the demanding state that the person claimed has
escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his
bail, probation or parole." 1 The statute also provides that
the indictment, information or affidavit must substantially
charge the person demanded with having committed a
crime, and that the copy of the indictment, information,
affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be au-
thenticated by the executive authority making the de-
mand.22
The purpose of authentication by the governor of the
demanding state is to satisfy the governor of this state
that the copy of the instrument is not spurious. However,
no particular form of authentication is required; and if
the requisition signed by the demanding governor contains
language asserting that the copy of the indictment, infor-
mation, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence an-
nexed thereto is authentic, it is sufficient."
'OII0 G. C. sec. 109-3.
2Ibid.
' Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319 (1878) ; In re Sanders, 10 Ohio 0.
1, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 605 (1937). An affidavit charging the offense upon which
extradition is based need not be certified on its face as authentic, and it is not
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The requisitions issued by the governors of the several
states vary somewhat as to form. They are generally alike
in substance, however, and contain approximately the same
recitals that are contained in the demand or requisition
used in Ohio.
Substantial Charge of Crime
The Uniform Act is explicit in providing that the ac-
cused must be substantially charged with having committed
a crime under the laws of the demanding state." The term
"crime" is not confined to felonies or otherwise limited in
scope. It has been held that the phrase "treason, felony or
other crime" used in the Constitution includes every offense
under the laws of the demanding state, and therefore in-
cludes misdemeanors."
If the crime charged is not an offense under the laws
of the demanding state, the governor has no jurisdiction to
issue a warrant. "2 On the other hand, the fact that the in-
dictment, information or affidavit may be defective in form
is not a reason for refusing extradition if the accused is
substantially charged with crime."' The question whether
unusual to embody such certificate in the requisition itself. In re Powell, 10
Ohio 0. 54, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (1937). See 18 OHIo JUR. "Extradition"
pp. 941-945, par. 15-18; 22 A.. JUR. "Extradition" pp. 274-279, par. 38, 40, 41.
There is no requirement of the federal statutes that there be any particular form
of attestation of the clerk with the certificate of the judge. In re Sanders, supra.
"OHio G. C. sec. 109-3.
"State v. Hudson, 2 Ohio N. P. 1, 2 Ohio D. (N. P.) 41 (1893), affirmed,
211 Ohio C. C. 660, 10 Ohio C. D. 812, 33 W. L. B. 26 (189) ; 52 Ohio St. 673,
44 N. E. 1138 (1895) ; see 22 Am. JtR. "Extradition" p. 270, par. 30 and cases
cited.
See, Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319, 325 (1878).
'Jackson v. Archibald, 12 Ohio C. C. 155, 5 Ohio C. D. 533 (1896)
In re Williams, 5 Ohio App. 55, 25 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 249, 27 Ohio C. D. 385
(1915); Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319 (1878) ; see Notes (1932) 81
A. L. R. 552, 565; 22 Am. JuL "Extradition" p. 267, par. 27. An affidavit is
not sufficient, however, if founded on belief or information. In re Powell, 10
Ohio 0. 54, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (1937),
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there is a substantial charge of crime may be determined by
comparing the charge with the statutes of the demanding
state, of which the courts of this state will take judicial
notice. 8 Occasionally the question presents considerable
difficulty; but where there is a reasonable probability that
the courts of the demanding state would hold the charge
adequate, extradition should not be denied."9
While the accused must be substantially charged with
crime, the truth or falsity of such charge is not a proper
matter of inquiry, except in one situation. The Uniform
Act provides that the guilt or innocence of the accused as
to the crime of which he is charged may not be inquired
into by the governor, or in any proceeding after the de-
mand shall have been presented to the governor, except as
it may be involved in determining identity, hereinafter
noted."0 This limitation is often regarded by the lawyer
as a hardship, and frequently presents difficulty in extra-
dition hearings. There is no discretion in the matter, how-
ever, and it must be strictly observed.
Fugitive from Justice
The term "fugitive from justice" perhaps has caused
more controversy in extradition matters than any other
aspect of the subject. The Federal Constitution, provides
'Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319 (1878).
' See note 27 supra. "The form of indictment may be good under the
statutes of Missouri; but be this as it may, it charges the crime of embezzle-
ment, and the sufficiency of the form in which the charge is made must be left
for the determination of the courts of that state." Ex parte Sheldon, 84 Ohio
St. 319, 326 (1878).
' Orno G. C. sec. 109-20; lit re Powell, 10 Ohio 0. 54, 25 Ohio L. Abs.
417 (1937) ; see, In re Sanders, 10 Ohio 0. 1, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 605 (1937). The
question of the present sanity or insanity of an alleged fugitive from justice
may not be considered, but must be determined by the law and courts of the
demanding state. State ex rel. Davey, Governor, et al. v. Owen, Judge, et al.,
133 Ohio St. 96, 10 Ohio 0. 102, 12 N. E. (2nd) 144, 114 A. L. R. 686, 693
(1937) ; see Note (1938) 4 Oio ST., L. J., 356, 11 OHio BAR 485.
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for the rendition of persons "who shall flee from justice,
and be found in another state."'" The books are replete with
cases interpreting this phrase. While there is a lack of
uniformity, the decided weight of authority, both in Ohio
and elsewhere, is to the effect that one is a fugitive from
justice if he was present in the demanding state at the time
he is alleged to have committed the crime but is absent
therefrom when he is sought to answer, regardless of his
motive or purpose in leaving the demanding state." The
Uniform Extradition Act contains a specific expression of
this point of view. The demand must allege, and the gov-
ernor of this state must find,."that the accused was present
in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the state."3
There is one exception to these requirements of the
statute. The governor of this state may also surrender
on demand a person charged in another state with commit-
ting an act in Ohio, or in a third state, intentionally re-
sulting in a crime in the demanding state. In such case,
U. S. CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 2, cited supra note 3.
"To constitute a fugitive from the justice of a State . . . it is not re-
quired that the person should have fled secretly or suddenly with the conscious-
ness of having committed the offense, or hurriedly for the purpose of avoiding
apprehended process of the law. It is sufficient that, being within the jurisdiction
at the alleged time of the commission of the offense, he has subsequently de-
parted before a reasonable time for prosecution shall have elapsed." Johnson
and Johnson v. Ammons, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 747 (1879). See Wilcox v. Nolze,
'34 Ohio St. 524 (1878) ; In re Mutchler, 8 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 345, 19 Ohio D.
(N. p.) '57 (1909) ; Jackson v. Archibald, 12 Ohio C. C. 155, 5 Ohio C. D.
533 (1896); 18 OHio JuR. "Extradition" pp. 937-939, par. 9, 10, p. 948, par.
23; 22 Am. Jum p. 259, par. 21; Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 415. As to extradi-
tion of persons who left the demanding state by official permission, see Notes
(1930) 67 A. L. R. 1480; as to extradition of escaped or paroled convicts, see
Notes (1932) 78 A. L. R. 419; and as to persons who were not in demanding
state at time of crime, but subsequently entered and departed therefrom, see
Notes (1934) 91 A. L. R. 1262. For discussion concerning sufficiency of state-
ments in demanding papers as allegation or proof that accused is fugitive, see
Notes (1941) 135 A. L. R. 973.
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-3.
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extradition may be granted even though the accused was
not in that state at the time the crime was committed and
has not fled therefrom."' Prior to adoption of the Uniform
Act, it had been held that the language of the Const;tution
does not contemplate constructive presence of the accused
in the demanding state and constructive flight therefrom."
The exception written into the Act meets this situation.
A requisition recently presented to the Governor of
Ohio rested entirely upon this provision of the Uniform
Act.3" The accused had in New York been jointly indicted
with a resident of that state for the crimes of abortion and
manslaughter. The evidence showed that he was not pres-
ent in the State of New York either at the time the alleged
abortion was performed or thereafter. In fact, he was a
resident of Ohio and was employed in this state. His only
connection with the crimes lay in the fact that he allegedly
had made financial arrangements with the abortionist in
New York, and persuaded the victim to submit to the op-
eration in that state. Under the statutes of New York, a
person is criminally liable to punishment who, being with-
out that state, causes, procures, aids or abets another to
commit a crime within the state. New York statutes also
provide that a person is criminally liable who, being with-
' OHIo G. C. sec. 109-6; see 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. "Extradition" p.
179, par. 6; (1940) 24 MINN. L. Rxv. 248; (1936) 5 FORDHAm L. REV. 484;
Taylor v. Smith, 13 N. E. (2nd) 954 (Ind. 1938).
"sWilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520 (1878); Ex Parte Larney, 8 Ohio
Dec. Rep. 348, 4 Ohio N. P. 304, 5 Ohio D. (N. P.) 541 (1882); Thomas v.
Evans, 14"Ohio D. (N. P.) 336 (1902); see 18 OHIo JuR. p. 937, par. 9. The
consequences of this conclusion are at once apparent in a factual situation such
as was presented in State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909 (1894), in which it was held
that "where one, standing in North Carolina, by the firing of a bullet, killed
another standing in Tennessee, the assault or stroke was in the latter State and
at common law the murder was committed in that State and its Courts alone
have jurisdiction of the offense." Under the Constitution, however, the accused
could not be extradited to Tennessee because, not having been physically
present in that State, he was not a fugitive therefrom,
"In re Culbertson (1941).
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out the state and with intent to cause within it a result
contrary to the laws of New York, does an act which in its
natural and usual course results in an act or effect con-
trary to its laws. In view of these facts, it was held that
the case came within the aforesaid section of the Uniform
Act, and a warrant was issued thereunder by the Governor.
In this case counsel for the accused contended that this
section of the statute, which permits extradition of one
who was not physically present in the demanding state, is
unconstitutional. It was held, however, that the governor
acts in an executive and not in a judicial capacity;3" and
therefore that it is his duty to follow or apply the statute
until such time as it may have been declared invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction. That the question of con-
stitutionality should be raised, however, is not unusual. The
Constitution contemplates extradition only of persons who
shall "flee from justice," and it does not apply, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, to persons who were not in the de-
manding state at the time the crime is alleged to have been
committed. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Con-
stitution which places any restriction on the power of the
states to deal with situations outside the scope of the spe-
cific constitutional provisions. Consequently the writer
has been of the opinion that this section of the statute is
valid, and that its enactment may be justified as an exercise
of the reserved sovereign power of the state."
This view was recently confirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for Cuyahoga County, Ohio in the Culbertson case.
Following issuance of the Governor's warrant, habeas
corpus proceedings were instituted in the Common Pleas
'See Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520, 523 (1878).
:'See (1936) 5 FORDEmA L. REv. 484, 489, excerpts noted in THE HAND-
BOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL (1940), p. 35; Gordon Dean, The Interstate
Compact-A Device for Crh;e Repression (1934) 1 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMAS, 460, excerpts noted in THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME
CONTROL, supra, at 36; 22 AM. JUR. "Extradition" p. 249, par. 9.
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Court of Cuyahoga County and the writ was denied.
The matter thereupon was appealed upon the ground that
Ohio G. C., 109-6 is in conflict with Article IV, Sec. 2 of
the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals,
affirming the lower court in an opinion which as yet is
unreported, expressed itself in the syllabus as follows:
"Section 109-6, G. C. which provides for right to grant
a request of a sister state for the extradition of a person
from the state of Ohio where such person is charged in
such sister state with having committed a crime therein,
even though the person so charged was not in the request-
ing state at the time of the commission of such crime and
has therefore not fled therefrom, is not in conflict with
Sec. 2 Article IV of the Federal Constitution and comes
clearly within the reserved sovereign powers of the state."
This case is important not only because it recognizes
the reserved power of the states to deal with extradition
matters outside the scope of the Federal Constitution and
statutes, but because it is believed to be the first decision
by an appellate court in the United States upholding the
clause which authorizes extradition of one who was not
present in the demanding state at the time of commission
of the crime. The case is now pending in the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
The manner in which this section of the law may be
invoked may present difficulty. The statute refers to a per-
son in this state "charged in such other state in the manner
provided in section 3 (Ohio G. C. 109-3) with committing
an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally result-
ing in a crime in the state whose executive authority is
making the demand." " This might be interpreted to mean
that the charge described in the statute must be contained
in the indictment, information or affidavit which accom-
0' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-6.
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panies the requisition. On the other hand, a more liberal
interpretation would hold that the charge is adequately
made if specified in the requisition." The writer is in-
clined to the latter view, providing the recitals contained
in the indictment, information or affidavit are not mate-
rially inconsistent therewith. But it seems clear that the
charge must be specified either in the requisition or in the
indictment, information or affidavit; and that the section is
not properly invoked if the accused is simply alleged to be
a fugitive from justice as in the ordinary case.
It should be observed in passing that the governor has
no duty to deliver up persons who are not fugitives from
justice in the actual sense. The statute above described is
permissive, not mandatory; and since it was not enacted
pursuant to the Constitution, it derives no compulsion
therefrom.
The most perplexing cases are those in which the ac-
cused is charged with desertion or non-support. 2 It has
been held that temporary presence within the demanding
state of one who is charged with failure to provide for
wife and children, even though such presence is for an
innocent purpose, is sufficient to constitute such person a
fugitive'from justice upon his departure from that state.4"
" In re Culbertson, cited supra note 36.
"The form of requisition recommended by The Interstate Commission on
Crime contains an alternative statement: . . ."that the accused was present
in this state at the time of the commission of said crime and thereafter fled
from this state, or said accused committed an act resulting in said crime in this
state . . ." A similar provision is contained in the form of governor's warrant
also recommended by the Commission. THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME
CONTROL (1940), pp. 30, 31.
See 18 OHIo JuR. "Extradition" p. 939, par. 11.
"A resident of one state who enters for a few hours for a lawful purpose
the boundaries of another state where his children reside, whom he is failing to
support, is subject to extradition after his return to his domicile, in a proceeding
against him for such non-support." People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237
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A case of this type was recently presented in Ohio." The
accused, an employee of a railroad company, was trans-
ferred to Ohio from Pennsylvania. By mutual arrange-
ment, the wife and family were to remain in Pennsylvania
until the husband had become established in his new loca-
tion. At the time he left them, and for some period after
the transfer to Ohio, the accused apparently supported his
wife and family within his means. He then discontinued
such support, although his employment was continuous,
and was thereupon indicted in Pennsylvania for wilful
neglect and separation. The evidence showed that on two
occasions during the period covered by the indictment he
returned to Pennsylvania, remaining there for a very
brief time on each occasion. By reason of these entries
into the demanding jurisdiction and departure therefrom
during the period the accused was charged with the crime,
it was held that he became a fugitive from justice, and the
warrant was issued by the Governor of Ohio.
On the other hand, where the accused furnished ade-
quate support to his family while he remained in the state
where they resided, but later moved to another state and
then failed to support them, it has been held that he was
not a fugitive from justice of the state where the wife or
child remained.45 A variation of this factual situation, in
which the same principle of law was involved, was pre-
N. Y. 483, 143 N. E. 653, 32 A. L. R. 1164, 1167 (1924); Chase v. State, 93
Fla. 963, 113 So. 103, 54 A. L. R. 271, 281 (1927).
"In re Goodrich (April 2, 1942).
45Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 A. 644, L. R. A. 1918 E 545 (1918);
Re Robertson, 38 Nev. 326, 149 P. 182, L. R. A. 1915 E 691 (1915); see Notes
32 A. L. R. 1167 and 54 A. L. R. 281, cited note 43 supra. In Taft v. Lord,
supra, the facts indicated that the accused and family resided in New York. He
alone moved to Connecticut after making temporary financial provision for his
wife and children, and later brought them to Connecticut. Shortly thereafter,
the parties quarreled and the wife took the children back to New York where
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sented in another case recently considered in Ohio." The
accused and his family, who had resided for some time in
Ohio, moved to Boston where he obtained employment.
Shortly thereafter a quarrel occurred and he returned to
Ohio where he was reemployed. Sometime later he re-
turned to Boston to see his family. Immediately upon his
arrival, he was arrested on a non-support charge and was
convicted and sentenced to serve a term of six months. On
the day of his release from confinement he boarded a bus
at East Boston arriving in Ohio on the next day. The evi-
dence showed that, upon his return to Ohio, he sent a letter
and two telegrams to his wife advising her that he was
free and had returned to Ohio to work, but that no replies
were received. Thereafter he failed to provide support, an
indictment was returned in Massachusetts charging non-
support for a period beginning on the date of his release
from confinement in Massachusetts, and extradition was
sought.
While there were valid arguments on both sides, it was
held that the accused was not a fugitive from justice and
extradition was denied. The decision rested on the follow-
ing facts: (1) When the accused completed his term of
service, such service disposed of all criminal neglect com-
mitted prior to the date of such incarceration. (2) The
accused was at liberty in the State of Massachusetts for a
few hours at the most on the day he left East Boston for
they continued to live. An indictment was returned against the accused in
New York and extradition from Connecticut was sought. The court held that,
under these facts, the accused was not a fugitive from justice. In the opinion,
the court said: "It may well be that by his conduct towards his children, he
has rendered himself answerable to the State of New York for a violation of
its criminal laws, but clearly he is not a fit subject for a compulsory return to
that State as a fugitive from justice therefrom, in order that he may be required
to answer to such charge." Id. at 546.
"lit re Seward (March 4, 1942).
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Ohio, being the interval between the time he was released
from confinement and the time he obtained bus transporta-
tion. (3) There was no continuing crime on the day the
accused was released from confinement; in fact, it was
alleged that his prison earnings had been turned over to
the family and that his return to Ohio was motivated by
the fact that he could obtain employment there. In view
of all these circumstances, it was felt that the accused
could not be regarded as a fugitive from justice within
the meaning of the statute. The difficulty presented in
cases of desertion and non-support can nowbe avoided,
it would seem, by invoking the provisions of section 6 of
the Uniform Act in those instances where the accused is
not clearly a fugitive from justice according to traditional
standards.'
There is one further statutory provision concerning
the requirement that the accused be a fugitive from justice.
The Uniform Act provides that the governor may also sur-
render on demand persons charged with crime in another
state even though such persons left the demanding state
involuntarily. 8 The reason for this provision lies in the
fact that the decisions are conflicting upon the question
whether a person who is taken from a state by legal com-
pulsion thereby becomes a fugitive from justice."
Identity of the Accused
The question always may be raised in extradition cases
whether the person held has been identified as the person
4TOHIo G. C. sec. 109-6.
OHio G. C. sec. 109-5 (par. 2).
"
9 See Notes (1933) 85 A. L. R. 118; Note 9 UNIFORm LAWS ANN.
"Extradition" p. 178.
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charged with the crime, the issue being whether the pro-
ceedings are directed against him. The question is not
whether the prisoner committed the crime, but whether he
is the person charged and intended by the requisition or
warrant. " Consequently, proof of an alibi or of absence
from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
is not relevant or admissible unless such proof "is probative
of the fact that the accused is not a fugitive from jus-
tice." 51
As a matter of practice, the question of identity is fre-
quently inseparable from the question whether the accused
is a fugitive from the demanding state. In an extradition
case recently considered in the Executive Offices, the ac-
cused was charged by affidavit and warrant with the crime
of armed robbery alleged to have been committed in the
State of Kentucky." The accused was identified by the
victim and his wife as the person who entered his place of
business and committed the robbery. At the same time, the
accused was identified by reputable business persons of
Cincinnati, Ohio, as a man who had transacted business
with them in Cincinnati at the very time the crime was al-
leged to have been committed in Kentucky. It was neces-
sary to choose between the testimony of the prosecuting
witnesses and the witnesses for the accused and, after
weighing all of the pertinent evidence, that offered by the
" See, In re Williams, 5 Ohio App. 55, 59, 25 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 249, 37
Ohio C. C. 385 (1915) ; Ex parte Van Vleck, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 636, 7 Am. L.
Rec. 275 (1878); Ex parte Moore, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 272, 275, 2 W. L. Bull. 42
(1877); 18 OHIo JUm "Extradition" p. 950, par. 24; Notes (1933) 84 A. L. R.
:37, 339.
" Ex parte Larney, 4 Ohio N. P. 304, 5 Ohio D. 541, 7 W. L. B. 149
(1881) ; see State cx rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 102, 12 N. E. (2nd)
144, 114 A. L. R. 686 (1937); Notes (1927) 51 A. L. R. 797, 811; (1929) 61
A. L. R. 715, 717; 22 A.. JUR. "Extradition" p. 294, par. 54.
' In re Jackson (April 2, 1942).
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witnesses for the accused was deemed worthy of greater
weight. One important factor was the fact that when the
victim saw the accused the day after the robbery he was
not certain that he was the person who committed the
crime. It was not until he saw him a second time that he
did so identify him. The extradition, therefore, was de-
nied by the Governor on the ground that the accused was
not a fugitive from justice.
A similar case arose in connection with the demand of
the State of Indiana for the rendition of a resident of Ohio
who was indicted on account of a swindle alleged to have
been perpetrated in that state seven years earlier." The
victim of the swindle identified the accused as one of the
persons who participated therein. The evidence showed,
however, that shortly after the crime was alleged to have
been committed the victim went to the State of Tennessee
to identify the same person, and at that time was unable
to identify him as one of those who committed the crime.
There was no testimony whatever to the effect that the ac-
cused was in the state of Indiana or in any state other than
Ohio at the time of the alleged crime. On the contrary,
testimony was offered by the accused to show that he was
in Ohio at the time the crime was committed. Conse-
quently, extradition was denied on the ground that the
accused was not a fugitive from justice. In this case, as
in the previous one, absence from the scene of the crime, or
an alibi, could be shown because such evidence was proba-
tive of the fact that the accused was not a fugitive from
justice.
Occasionally, however, the question whether the per-
son arrested is the person charged and intended by the
requisition is squarely raised. A case of this type was pre-
'it re Thompson (October 23, 1941).
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sented within recent months upon demand of the Governor
of Pennsylvania for the return to that state of one charged
with extortion. 4 In this case the accused was known by
several aliases. It was the contention of his counsel that
he was not the person named in the requisition. For the
purpose of establishing identity, the State of Pennsyl-
vania offered the testimony of the victim of the alleged
swindle who described the person who perpetrated the
crime upon him and identified him by photograph. In ad-
dition, he identified and there was offered in evidence a
certain instrument alleged to have been signed by the ac-
cused and given to the victim as a part of the transaction.
Counsel for the accused denied the photograph to be that
of the accused and the instrument to be in his handwriting.
He offered, however, subject to the consent of his client, to
produce specimens of the accused's handwriting for the
purpose of determining identity. Such specimens were pro-
duced and upon examination thereof it clearly appeared
that the handwriting in each instance was the same as that
appearing in the instrument alleged to have been signed
by the person who perpetrated the crime. Accordingly,
the question of identity was resolved in favor of the State
of Pennsylvania and the warrant was issued by the Gover-
nor. In this case the question of identity was not related to
the question whether the person held was a fugitive from
justice. In fact, other evidence indicated that the person
held was in the state of Pennsylvania at the time of the
alleged crime.
In passing it should be remembered that the task of
identifying the person held as the person charged with the
crime is the only situation in which matters of guilt or in-
" In re Abels (January 17, 1942),
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nocence may be involved either in a proceeding before the
governor or in any proceeding thereafter.5
Good Faith of the Proceedings
The statutes in effect in Ohio prior to adoption of the
Uniform Act specifically provided that the demand upon
the governor of this state by the executive authority of an-
other state must be made in good faith." The Uniform
Act, however, contains neither the same nor any similar
provision. The question therefore may be raised whether,
by reason of repeal of the former statute, the governor of
this state is deprived of the right to inquire into the good
faith of the foreign prosecution.
There is authority for the proposition that where an
extradition is based on ulterior motive, such as collecting
private claims or gratifying personal malice, it may be re-
fused within the discretion of the governor. This view
was clearly expressed in an early Ohio case decided under
a statute which, like the present one, made no reference to
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-20; see Note 30 supra.
'Former OHIO G. C. sec. 110, which provided that the requisition of the
demanding state must be accompanied by sworn evidence "that the demand is
in good faith for the punishment of crime and not for the purpose of the collec-
tion of debt or pecuniary mulct or of removing the alleged fugitive to a foreign
jurisdiction to serve him with civil process." In re Williams, 5 Ohio App. 55,
25 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 249, 37 Ohio C. C. 385 (1915); Compton v. Wilder,
40 Ohio St. 130, 133 (1883).
" The Uniform Act does require, in connection with the return of fugitives
from this state, that the prosecuting attorney who applies for the requisition
shall certify that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce a private claim.
OHIO G. C. sec. 109-23. There is also a good faith requirement in connection
with the requisition of fugitives in cases of international extradition. The
governor must be "satisfied by sworn evidence that extradition is sought in
good faith for the punishment of the crime named and not for the purpose of
collecting a debt or pecuniary mulct or of bringing the alleged fugitive within
the state of Ohio to serve him with civil process other than for the crime for
which his extradition is sought." OHIO G. C. sec. 117.
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good faith. " On the other hand, it has been held that the
question of motive or purpose of the prosecution may not be
inquired into on the hearing of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus following the issuance of the governor's
warrant."
In the most recent Ohio case on the subject," the State
of New York sought to extradite the accused, a woman,
upon indictments for larceny and embezzlement. The facts
showed that the accused had been employed as business
agent for a number of years by another woman who main-
tained residence both in New York and Ohio. Subsequent
to termination of this employment, the accused obtained
"
3Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64, 32 Am. Rep. 345 (1877). "To
employ this extraordinary process for public purposes tends to secure peace and
good order; but to prostitute it to the advancement of private ends is to bring
it into great disfavor . . . No satisfactory reason is perceived why a governor
should issue or obey a requisition when he is satisfied that the sole object of
the party complaining is to enforce the payment of a private claim for money.
Such an abuse of process is equivalent to a fraudulent use of it." Id. at 74.
See 72 Ohio L. 79. It should be observed, however, that the governor adopted
and followed a suggestion contained in a joint resolution adopted by the general
assembly on March 2-5, 1870. In this resolution, the general assembly expressed
the opinion that the governor should not make or allow requisitions "until
clearly satisfied that the requisition is sought in good faith for the punishment
of crime . . ." 67 Ohio 0. L. 171. In ex parte Maloney, 27 Ohio C. A. 529,
29 Ohio C. D. 357, 63 Bull. 33 (1917), aff. 98 Ohio St. 463 (1918), the court
held that former OHIO G. C. sec. 110 did not authorize the court at the hearing
provided in former G. C. secs. 113 and 114 to determine whether the proceeding
is in good faith, and that if it did so authorize it would be unconstitutional.
However, the court did say: "But as we read this section and construe it, we
think it applies to the Governor of the state, and not to a judge of the court
of common pleas. It was passed for the purpose of guiding the Governor in
determining whether or not a warrant should be issued." Id. at 534. See Notes
(1935) 94 A. L. R. 1493, 1495; 22 Am. Jun. "Extradition" p. 254, par. 15.
" Ex parte Van Vleck, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 636, 7 Am. L. Rec. 275 (1878);
Ex parte Maloney, 27 Ohio C. A. 529, 29 Ohio C. D. 357, 63 W. L. Bull. 33
(1917) cited note 38 supra; see In re Gregg, 35 Abs. 378, aff. 139 Ohio St. 170
(1941). In the case of People, ex rel. v. Murray, 357 Ill. 326, 192 N. E. 198
(1934) a statute authorizing inquiry, in a habeas corpus proceeding, into the
question whether the requisition is made in good faith was held unconstitutional
by reason of being in conflict with Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the U. S. Constitution.
"In re Gregg, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 378, aff. 139 Ohio St. 170 (1941).
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judgments in Ohio for more than sixty-five thousand dol-
lars against her former employer. Thereafter the em-
ployer charged the accused with embezzlement and later
indictments were returned.
At the extradition hearing in the Governor's Office, the
accused sought to show that the prosecution was not in
good faith. The argument was that the prosecuting wit-
ness had instituted the criminal proceedings against her
former employee in order to impede collection of the judg-
ments or to embarrass her in her efforts to collect them. In
order to rebut any inference of "bad faith" which might
arise from the foregoing circumstances, the assistant dis-
trict attorney of New York County offered testimony to
show (1) that the State of New York did not act when the
prosecuting witness filed her original affidavit; (2) that an
investigation was ordered; (3) that the accounting staff
of the district attorney's office was assigned to assist in the
investigation; and (4) that bank records, brokerage ac-
counts and other documents belonging to the parties were
subpoenaed. In addition, the method of investigation and
the nature of the testimony and other evidence accumulated
during the investigation were disclosed. From all this it
order to rebut any presumption of "bad faith" which might
was made clear that the prosecution in New York would
not proceed upon the testimony of the prosecuting witness
unsupported by substantial corroborating evidence. Ac-
cordingly, the prosecution was held to be in good faith and
the warrant was issued by the Governor."
In his opinion and recommendation to the Governor, the writer said:
"Whether the indictment is true or whether the explanation offered by the
accused is true, is wholly and absolutely immaterial in this proceeding. When
you face that fact and discover that there was an independent investigation
resulting in certain findings which are supported by documentary evidence,
which may or may not be valid, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no
bad faith on the part of the District Attorney. In other words, the malice or
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Upon issuance of the Governor's warrant, a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was filed by the accused in the
Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Evi-
dence offered by the accused to show that the prosecution
in New York was not in good faith was rejected by the
trial court and the prayer of the petition was denied. The
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals," and an
appeal as of right to the Supreme Court was dismissed for
the reason that no debatable constitutional question was in-
volved."
Clearly the Supreme Court's judgment, following the
earlier pronouncement, does not proscribe inquiry by the
Governor into the question of good faith of the prosecu-
tion."s In the absence of a specific prohibition, it is the
present policy in the Executive Offices to consider whether
the proceedings are in good faith in any case where the
question is raised. But a requisition is denied on this
ground only where it is clear that the prosecuting authori-
ties, as distinguished from interested parties, are not acting
in good faith. In other words, even though a prosecuting
witness may be acting from an ulterior motive, this fact
will not be permitted to defeat the requisition if it is clear
that the prosecuting attorney is acting in good faith and
with the intention of prosecuting to the full extent of the
law." Bad faith on the part of a prosecuting witness will
ulterior motive of the prosecuting witness, if any, is of no importance in this
hearing because adequate evidence has been submitted to rebut any inference of
bad faith on the part of the prosecuting authorities."
'Inz re Gregg, 05 Ohio L. Abs. 878 (1941), cited notes 59 and 60 supra.
"It is our opinion that whatever the law may have been previous to the repeal
of See. 110 G. C., evidence as to the motive or good faith of a prosecution is not
now admissible in a habeas corpus proceeding in an extradition matter in Ohio."
Id. at 879.
'In re Gregg, 139 Ohio St. 170 (1941), cited notes 59 and 60 supra.
" See note 58 supra.
'See note 61 supra.
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defeat a requisition only where it may also be imputed to
the prosecuting officer or where the prosecuting officer in-
tentionally or through ignorance, carelessness or indiffer-
ence lends the power of his office to the satisfaction of
some personal malice or the settlement of some civil obli-
gation.
Proceedings Subsequent to Executive Hearing
Having considered the questions that may be raised in
an extradition hearing in the executive offices, let us now
consider the proceedings subsequent thereto.
If the governor decides that the demand should not be
complied with, that puts an end to the matter. From the
decision there is no appeal." In such event, the governor
of the demanding state is notified by letter of the refusal
and the reasons therefor.
If the governor decides that the demand should be
complied with, he is required to sign a warrant of arrest
directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may
think fit to entrust with execution thereof. The warrant
must be sealed with the state seal and must contain a sub-
stantial recital of the facts necessary to the validity of its
issuance. The statute also provides that such warrant
shall authorize the peace officer to arrest the accused at any
time and any place where he may be found within the state,
to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in
"The governor of Ohio cannot, through the judiciary or any other depart-
ment of government, be compelled to deliver up an alleged fugitive from justice.
Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor of Ohio, 24 Howard 66 (1860). See Notes
(1894) 8 HAn. L. Rav. 416. The demanding jurisdiction, however, may present
a second requisition. See 22 Am. JUR. "Extradition" p. 296, in which it is
pointed out that "where a first application for extradition is refused on the
ground that the evidence presented is insufficient, it leaves the proceeding in
the same condition as in other cases of preliminary examination, and there may
be a second inquiry."
OHIo G. C. sec. 109-7.
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the execution thereof, and to deliver the accused to the
duly authorized agent of the demanding state. 8
Before the accused may be delivered to the duly au-
thorized agent of the demanding state, however, the
statute requires that he shall first be taken before a judge
of a court of record in this state, who shall inform him of
the demand, of the crime with which he is charged and
that he has the right to demand and procure legal coun-
sel." If the accused or his counsel desires to test the legal-
ity of arrest, and shall so state, the judge is required to fix
a reasonable time within which the accused may apply for
a writ of habeas corpus."° If such writ is applied for, no-
tice of the time and place of hearing thereon must be given
to the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest
is made and in which the accused is in custody, and also to
the agent of the demanding state. 1 It is a misdemeanor
for an officer to deliver the accused contrary to the fore-
going provisions.7"
Occasionally it will be discovered that while the ac-
cused is extraditable, criminal proceedings have been in-
stituted against him under the laws of this state and are
still pending. In such cases, the governor, in his discretion,
may surrender the accused to the demanding state or he
OHio G. C. see. 109-8. "Every such peace officer or other person . ..,
shall have the same authority, in arresting the accused, to command assistance
therein, as peace officers have by law in the execution of any criminal process
directed to them, with like penalties against those who refuse their assistance."
OHIO G. C. sec. 109-9.
" ORio G. C. sec. 109-10.
"Ibid. Where proceedings are in conformity with law and accused is
held in custody by a sheriff pursuant to a warrant issued by the governor of
Ohio, for delivery to agent of demanding state under OHIO G. C. 109-1 et seq.,
the accused is lawfully restrained of his liberty. Ex parte Carpenter, 27 Ohio
L. Abs. 863 (1938).
Ibid.
= OHIo G. C. sec. 109-11.
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may hold him until he has been tried and discharged or
convicted and punished in this state."'
A case of this nature recently arose in Ohio. 4 The
State of Pennsylvania sought return of the accused on a
charge of wilful neglect to maintain wife and minor chil-
dren. The evidence showed that the accused was under in-
dictment and in custody in Franklin County, Ohio on a
perjury charge which was based upon an alleged false
oath in an action for divorce filed by the accused in that
county. Both the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge
on the criminal bench recommended that the accused be
released to Pennsylvania, stating that the charge here grew
out of the dome'stic difficulties of the parties in Pennsyl-
vania and that that state should be permitted to proceed
first. For this reason, and inasmuch as the right of this
state to regain custody of the accused upon his acquittal or
completion of sentence in Pennsylvania are safeguarded
under the Ohio statute," the warrant was issued by the
Governor.
It occasionally happens, after the governor's warrant
is issued, that evidence will be presented clearly establish-
ing a defect in the requisition or proceedings. The Uni-
form Act meets this situation by providing that the gov-
ernor may recall his warrant of arrest or may issue another
warrant whenever he deems proper."6 This was the law,
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-19. See 19 OHIo JuR. "Extradition" p. 939, par. 12.
' In re Goodrich (April 2, 1942) cited note 44 supra.
"Nothing in this act contained shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by
this state of its right, power or privilege to try such demanded person for crime
committed within this state or of its right, power or privilege to regain custody
of such person by extradition proceedings or otherwise for the purpose of trial,
sentence or punishment for any crime committed within this state, nor shall any
proceedings had under this act which'result in, or fail to result in, extradition
be deemed a waiver by this state of any of its rights, privileges or jurisdiction
in any way whatsoever." OHIO G. C. sec. 109-27.
' OHIo G. C. sec. 109-21.
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however, prior to adoption of the Uniform Act. In an
early case, the Supreme Court held that if a warrant for
the surrender of a fugitive from justice is obtained in a
case in which it should not have been issued, the governor
may revoke it, whether issued by himself or his predeces-
sor. It is the policy of the Governor, however, to recall a
warrant only for the purpose of hearing the new evidence,
after which final action will be taken in conformity with
the findings thereon.
One other provision incident to execution of the gov-
ernor's warrant should be mentioned. The statute pro-
vides that the officer or agent to whom the prisoner may
have been delivered may, when necessary, confine the pris-
oner in the jail of any county or city through which he
may pass.7" In the same manner, when an officer or agent
having a prisoner in custody is passing through this state
from another state to the demanding state, he may when
necessary confine the prisoner in the jail of any county or
city through which he may pass. In such a case the pris-
oner is not entitled to demand a new requisition while in
this state.7
REQUISITION OF FUGITIVES FROM THIS STATE
The governor of this state may request the executive
authority of another state to surrender fugitives from this
state in the following instances: (1) when the person de-
manded is charged with crime in this state; or (2) when
the person demanded has been convicted of a crime in this
state and has escaped from confinement or broken the
terms of his bail, probation or parole."
' Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64 (1877).
1 OHIo G. C. sec. 109-12.
'Ibld.
" Ouio G. C. sec. 109-23.
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Before the governor may act in any of these cases, it
is necessary that a written application for a requisition be
presented to him. Printed forms are available at the gov-
ernor's office and will be furnished upon request. In the
case of a person charged with a crime in this state, the
application for the requisition must be presented by the
prosecuting attorney of the county in which the charge
is made. Such application must state the name of the per-
son charged, the crime charged against him, the approxi-
mate time, place and circumstances of its commission,"
the state in which he is believed to be, including the lo-
cation of the accused therein; and the prosecuting attorney
must certify that in his opinion the ends of justice require
the arrest and return of the accused to this state for trial
and that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce a pri-
vate claim."
In the case of a person who has been convicted of a
crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or
broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole, the ap-
plication for the requisition must be presented by the prose-
cuting attorney of the county in which the offense was
committed, the parole board, or the warden of the insti-
tution or sheriff of the county from which escape was
made. Such application must state the name of the per-
'If the accused was personally present in this state at the time of the
commission of the crime and thereafter fled from the state, the application should
so allege. But if section 6 of the Uniform Act is invoked, the application
should allege that the accused committed an act in the asylum state, or in a third
state, intentionally resulting in a crime in this state. The latter procedure may
be followed only in the event the demand is to be made on a state which also
has adopted section 6 of the Uniform Act. See note 41 supra.
'Ibid. Where an Ohio prosecutor in his application to the governor set
forth the making of a complaint and the issuance of a warrant and annexed an
affidavit of the complaining witness.setting forth the time, place and circum-
stances of the alleged crime, there was sufficient compliance with the statute.
it re Molisak, 291 Mich. 46, 288 N. W. 329 (1939).
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son, the crime of which he was convicted, the circumstances
of his escape from confinement or of the breach of the
terms of his bail, probation or parole, and the state in
which he is believed to be, including his location therein."
In every case, the statute provides that the application
for requisition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be exe-
cuted in duplicate and shall be accompanied by two certi-
fied copies of (1) the indictment returned, or (2) informa-
tion and affidavit filed, or (3) the complaint made to the
judge or magistrate, stating the offense with which the
accused is charged, or (4) the judgment of conviction or
the sentence. The prosecuting officer, parole board,
warden or sheriff may also attach such further affidavits
and other documents in duplicate as he shall deem proper."
When the application for a requisition is presented at
the governor's office, it is immediately referred to the gov-
ernor's executive secretary who has charge of extradition
matters. If it is found to be defective in any respect, it
is returned at once to the officer filing it for correction or
revision. If it is found to be correct in all respects, and
fully in conformity with the Uniform Act, the executive
secretary causes a requisition to be prepared." One copy
of the application and one copy of each of the supporting
" OHIO G. C. sec. 109-23.
'Ibid. The writer suggests that a copy of the Ohio statute applicable in
the case also be attached.
" No statutory provision is made with respect to the form or content of
the requisition. It is believed, however, that it should conform to the specifica-
tions contained in OHIo G. C. sec. 109-3 pertaining to the demand of the execu-
tive authority of other states, for otherwise it would defeat the purpose of the
Act to achieve uniformity. Hence, in addition to the documents attached thereto,
the requisition should allege all of the facts therein required, including a state-
ment that the accused was present in this state at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime and thereafter fled from the state, or that he committed
an act in another state intentionally resulting in a crime in this state. See note
41, supra.
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documents are attached thereto,8" and- the entire requisi-
tion is then referred to the governor with the recommenda-
tion of the executive secretary for approval. If the gov-
ernor approves, he signs his name to the requisition and
the same is promptly delivered to the prosecuting officer
or agent.
The statute provides that one copy of the application
for requisition, with the action of the governor indicated
by endorsement thereon, and one of the certified copies
of the indictment, complaint, information, and affidavits,
or of the judgment of conviction or of the sentence, shall
be filed in the office of the secretary of state to remain of
record in that office." As a matter of practice, an addi-
tional copy of the application and supporting papers is
requested in each case and is kept on file in the governor's
office.
In addition to the requisition directed to the governor
of the state in which the accused is found, the governor
of this state is required to empower an agent to receive the
prisoner if delivered to him and convey him to the proper
officer of the county in this state in which the offense was
committed. This is accomplished by the issuance of a war-
rant under the seal of the state. Although the statute
provides that the warrant shall be issued "to some agent","9
it is the practice of the governor, providing no adequate
reason for doing otherwise is apparent, to appoint the
person who is nominated or designated for such purpose
in the application for the requisition. The warrant of ap-
pointment of agent is delivered to the prosecuting officer
or agent with the governor's requisition.
" The requisition also contains the governor's certificate as to the authen-
ticity of the annexed papers.
s' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-23.
'OHIao G. C. sec. 109-22.
" Ibid.
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The question is sometimes presented whether the ac-
cused is subject to service of process in civil actions in this
state when he is brought back by means of extradition
proceedings. This question is clearly answered by the
Uniform Act. Whether the accused is brought back by,
or after waiver of, extradition based on a criminal charge,
he is not subject to such personal process "until he has
been convicted in the criminal proceeding, or, if acquitted,
until he has had reasonable opportunity to return to the
state from which he was extradited." " Prior to adoption
of the Uniform Act, Ohio followed this rule of immunity
from service of civil process.9
Another question occasionally raised is whether the
accused, after being returned to Ohio by extradition pro-
ceedings or after waiver thereof, may be tried for other
crimes not designated in the requisition. The Uniform
Act answers this question in the affirmative." Prior to
adoption of the Act, the Ohio law was somewhat uncer-
tain. The Supreme Court, contrary to the majority view
elsewhere on this subject, " had held that the accused
could not be tried for a crime other than that for which
he was extradited unless he waived such privilege." There-
after, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a case
which arose in Georgia, decided that the accused has no
' Onio G. C. sec. 109-25.
"Compton, Ault & Co. v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130 (1883) ; Lotz v. Lotz,
23 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 309 (1921). The privilege of immunity may be waived by
the accused. White v. Marshall, 3 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 495, 23 Ohio C. C. 376.
When the accused, who was extradited from New York to Kentucky, was
served with summons in a civil action while passing through Ohio on his way
home by the party who caused his extradition, the court set aside the service.
Deuber Watch Co. v. Dalzell, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 227 (1888). See 18 OHlo
Jum "Extradition" p. 936, par. 8.
OHIO G. C. see. 109-28.
Notes 21 A. L. R. 1405, 1418.
"Ex parte McKnight, 48 Ohio St. 588, 14 L. R. A. 128, 28 N. E. 1034
(1891).
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right, privilege or immunity to be exempt from indictment
or trial for other or different crimes in the demanding
state. " After this decision but prior to adoption of the
Uniform Act, two Ohio courts took the view that the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court should be fol-
lowed notwithstanding the earlier pronouncement of the
Ohio Supreme Court."
The Uniform Act makes special provision for a case
where the accused is imprisoned or is held under criminal
proceedings pending against him in another state at the
time it is desired to have him returned to this state. In
such case, the governor of this state may agree with the
executive authority of such other state for the extradition
of such person before the conclusion of such proceedings
or his term of sentence in such other state. ' But the agree-
ment must be on condition that such person will be re-
turned to such other state at the expense of this state as
soon as the prosecution in this state is terminated.
Finally, a word concerning the payment of costs is in
order. The Uniform Act provides for payment of certain
expenses out of the state treasury, on the certificate of the
governor and warrant of the auditor,99 but the General
Assembly has never appropriated funds for this purpose.
However, the Ohio Code carries a provision in existence
for many years, which authorizes payment by the county
commissioners of "all necessary expenses of pursuing and
" Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 37 L. ed. 549, 13 Sup. Ct. 687 (1893).
In re Brophy 2 Ohio N. P. 230, 4 Ohio D (N. P.) 391 (1895) ; Ex parte
Moeller, 14 Ohio App. 300 (1921). See 18 OHIo Ju.. "Extradition" pp. 932-
935, par. 5.
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-5.
9 Ibid.
OHIO G. C. sec. 109-24. Such expenses include the fees paid to the
officers of the state on whose governor the requisition is made, and not exceeding
ten cents a mile for all necessary travel in returning the prisoner. Ibid.
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returning such person so charged, or so much thereof as to
them seems just" in cases where the governor has issued
a requisition.' The Attorney General of Ohio twice has
ruled that this statute was not repealed by implication upon
adoption of the Uniform Act."'
The question whether expenses may be paid out of the
state treasury has arisen in two cases where a person who
had been charged and convicted of a felony and sentenced
to a state penal or reformatory institution escaped from
the county jail and fled to another state or county. In the
first case no requisition was issued by the Governor, and
for this reason the Attorney General ruled that the ex-
penses could not lawfully be paid from the state treasury,
0 2
although they could lawfully be paid by the county com-
missioners."'a In the second case, extradition proceedings
were had, but the Attorney General ruled that payment
could only be made from county funds in the absence of
a specific legislative appropriation.'
CONCLUSION
In closing, there are two matters that ought to be
emphasized. The first pertains to the importance of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act as an instrumentality
of law enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
has estimated that the number of major crimes in the
United States during the year 1941 was 1,531,272. This
represented an increase of 14,246 crimes, or 0.9 percent,
O io G. C. sec. 2491.
. 1937 Ohio A. G. Opns. No. 12,36; 1940 Ohio A. G. Opns. No. 3186.
1940 Ohio A. G. Opns. No. 2021.
'The county commissioners may allow and pay the necessary expense
incurred by an officer in the pursuit of a person charged with felony, who has
fled the country." OHIO G. C. sec. 3015.
1' 1940 Ohio A. G. Opns. No. 3186. In this case payment by county com-
missioners would be pursuant to OnIo G. C. sec. 2491 cited note 100 supra.
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over the year 1940. The increases noted are as follows:
murder, 0.3 percent; negligent manslaughter, 3.5 percent;
rape, 2.2 percent; aggravated assault, 4.0 percent; larceny,
1.9 percent; and auto theft, 7.0 percent. Only robbery
and burglary declined, having decreased 6.7 percent and
4.4 percent respectively.105
While the relationship between crime generally and
extradition statistics of a single state does not warrant
any inferences or conclusions, it is interesting to note that
the number of demands made upon the Governor of Ohio
by the executive authorities of other states increased from
93 in 1940, to 109 in 1941. The demands in 1941 also
exceeded the number made in 1939, although by a smaller
margin.' On the other hand, the number of requisitions
"'UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, No. 4, January 1942, at 166. The report
further states: "More than 59 per cent of the crimes committed in 1941 were
larcenies; 21 percent were burglaries; 11.9 percent were auto thefts; and 3.1
percent were robberies. Thus it is seen that almost 96 percent of the offenses
were for the purpose of obtaining property. Murders, negligent manslaughters,
rapes, and other felonious assaults constituted the remaining 4.3 percent.
"More than 58 percent of the robbery cases were classed as highway
robberies; 33.9 percent of the robberies involved oil stations, chain stores, and
other commercial houses. Almost half of the burglaries in 1941 involved
residences. Two-thirds of the residence burglaries occurred at night, whereas
90 percent of nonresidence burglaries were committed during the night.
"Thefts of auto parts, accessories, and other property from automobiles
constituted 36 percent of the total larcenies in 1941, and in view of the probable
difficulty of obtaining replacements, automobile owners might well make addi-
tional provisions to safeguard their property. In 67.2 percent of the larcenies,
the stolen property was valued from $5 to $50; in 22.3 percent of the cases the
property was valued at less than $5; and property valued in excess of $50 was
stolen in 10.5 percent of the cases.
"The average value of property stolen per offense of robbery was $112.37;
for burglary, $60.56; and for larceny, $29.84. The average automobile stolen
in 1941 was valued at $458. In auto thefts, recoveries were effected in 95
percent of the cases, whereas slightly less than 22 percent of other types of
property was recovered. The average value of property stolen per offense was
higher in 1941 than-in 1940." Id. at 166.
... There were 104 demands made upon the Governor of Ohio in 1939, 93
in 1940 and 109 in 1941.
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issued by the Governor of Ohio in 1941 was slightly less
than in 1939 or 1940.107
Be that as it may, the Interstate Commission on Crime
is undoubtedly right when it avers that "one of the most
apparent needs in modernizing the administration of crim-
inal justice is that of facilitating the transfer of criminals
from one state to another, so that one state may not be-
come, unintentionally, a sanctuary for criminals who are
engaged in the commission of crimes in neighboring
states." ' The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is an
important factor in the solution of this problem. Of
special significance is the section which permits an ac-
cused to be delivered up even though he is not a fugitive
from justice in the constitutional sense.' As the Com-
mission points out, "the importance of this provision is
easily understood when thought is given to the vast con-
spiracies indulged in by organized criminals which may,
and often do, involve operations across the borders of
several states." 0
The second point of emphasis follows from the first;
the value of the Uniform Act as an instrumentality of law
enforcement will be enhanced to the extent that it is uni-
versally adopted and uniformly interpreted. As to the
former, substantial progress already has been made. The
original Uniform Act was proposed in 1926 by the Na-
""There were 150 requisitions issued by the Governor of Ohio in 1939, 149
in 1940 and 142 in 1941.
"THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIrE CONTROL (April 1, 1940), p. 20.
Other uniform acts sponsored by the Interstate Commission on Crime are:
Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit of Criminals (OHIo G. C. sec. 13434-4 to
13434-11) ; Uniform Act to Compel Attendance of Witnesses (OHIo G. C. sec.
13436-24 to 1:3436-31); Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision
(OHIO G. C. see. 108-1 to 108-3); Uniform Pistol Act; Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act (OHIO G. C. sec. 12672-1 to 12672-23).
"'OHIO G. C. see. 109-6, cited, .supra, notes 18, 34, 39, and 47.
" THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra, at page 21.
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tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, was amended in 1932, and was revised in 1936.
Adoption of the Act by thirty-one states during the period
of sixteen years attests the capacity of independent and
sovereign states to meet an interstate problem through
interstate cooperation and without resorting to federal leg-
islation. It is to be hoped that the remaining seventeen
states will adopt the Uniform Act in the near future.
As to uniformity of interpretation we must await the
verdict of history. There undoubtedly will be variations
but these variations will be of little consequence if gover-
nors and judges alike observe the mandate, written into
the Act itself, that its provisions "shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it"."' And this,
too, is within the realm of possibility.
' OHIO G. C. sec. 109-29.
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